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THE QUASI-CONTRACTUAL REMEDY IN CASES OF EXPRESS CONTRACT
INDUCED BY FRAUD
Legal duties are created by society for any sort of reason that seems
good to society. Thus, where a harmful act has been done by the
defendant with resulting profit to himself, the law can declare that
these facts shall operate to create either a duty in the defendant to
make good to the plaintiff for all tha damage suffered by him or a duty
in the defendant to restore to the plaintiff the amount of the profit
wrongfully received by the defendant. Both of these alternative duties
are secondary, remedial duties, created to redress the wrong done by a
tortious act. The first is the duty that is enforced in the more common
of tort actions like trespass and case. The second has come to be called
a quasi-contractual duty, chiefly because the form of action in which
it was recognized and enforced was assumpsit; by the use of fiction-
so common in the growth of our law-the tort was said to be waived
and a contract to be implied by the law. The use of the language of
fiction, such as this, might well be expected to result in error aid con-
fusion. Such a result is made almost certain by the prevailing
ignorance of the history and character of the common-law forms of
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action and by the failure to make an analysis of such a complex legal
concept as "contract" into simpler and more fundamental concepts.
In the case of Prest v. Farmington (1918, Me.) 1O4 Atl. 521, the
plaintiff sued for the reasonable value of work and labor performed
for the defendant, and to a plea by the defendant that the work was
done under express contract replied that the contract was induced by
the defendant's fraud. It was held that the plaintiff could recover
nothing beyond the agreed contract price, even though he could have
recovered more in an action of deceit and even though-the reasonable
value to the defendant of the work done by the plaintiff was more
than the agreed price. The court expressly says that in such a case
"indebitatus assumpsit" lies only for the contract price; that "Where
the parties have made a contract for themselves covering the whole
subject-matter, no promise is implied by the law"; and that "The duty
to pay damages for a tort does not imply a promise to pay them, upon
which assumpsit can be maintained."
The decision in this case can well be sustained for another reason
given by the court, that the plaintiff had discovered the fraud at an
early stage in the work and that his conduct since that time amounted
to a ratification of the express contract. The same can be said of some
of the cases cited by the court as authority.' As to the other reasons,
however, there must be vigorous dissent.
Indebitatus assumpsit is substantially identical with the action of
debt. To maintain either action at common law, it was necessary to
prove that the defendant had received a quid pro quo, and in both
actions the measure of recovery was the value of that quid pro quo.
Such value, however, might have been fixed at a liquidated sum by
the parties, and this sum would then be the measure of recovery. In
neither form of action was it necessary to prove an express promise
by the defendant.
The action of assumpsit was the form to .be used in any case where
the defendant had made an actual promise for a consideration, even
though this consideration did not consist of a quid pro quo received
b- the defendant and even though he had promised no liquidated sum.
_As long as this form of action was a true action of trespass on the case,
the measure of recovery was the damage suffered by the plaintiff, the
amount by which his estate had been decreased by his giving the con-
sideration; but by an unconscious process it departed from its tort
parent, and the measure of recovery came to be the value of the thing
promised, the amount by which the plaintiff's estate would have been
increased by complete performance.
It is obvious that there was a large field in which the two forms of
action overlapped, but each had its distinct and separate field also:
,Ferguson v. Carrington (1829, K. B.) 9B. & C. 59. Selway v. Fogg (1839,
Exch.) 5 M. & W. 83.
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debt would lie in many cases where the defendant had never promised
to pay, either expressly or by implication in fact; and assumpsit would
lie even though the defendant had never received a quid pro quo and
had not agreed to pay a liquidated sum of money.
The statement of the court in Prest v. Farmington that "Where the
parties have made a contract for themselves, covering the whole
subject-matter, no promise is implied by law" is one of those glittering
generalities of which our legal literature is so full. It can be found
repeated in scores of cases, 2 and in a considerable number it has caused
an erroneous and unjust decision. In its proper signification it means
no more than that when two parties are contracting expressly they
are not contracting tacitly, that when parties reduce their agreement
to words their mutual intentions will be determined by those words
and not by mere inferences from other conduct. Where there is an
express contract no other should be implied in fact.
3 This rule is
properly applied in all cases where the legally operative facts are the
words of agreement, even though the plaintiff may be seeking a remedy
in an action of debt or indebitatus assumpsit.' Where the remedy on
the express contract has been barred by the statute of limitations, the
law will not construct a quasi-contractual debt in order to avoid the
effect of the statute.' But on the other hand, there are many classes of
cases where a quasi-contractual debt was constructed by the law in
spite of the existence of an express agreement. Such is the case
where the express contract is unenforceable because of the statute of
frauds ;6 or because of illegality, the plaintiff not being in pan delicto;7
or even because of the non-fulfillment of some condition precedent by
'Phelps v. Sheldon (1832, Mass.) 13 Pick. 52; Whiting v. Sullivan (81o)
7 Mass. 1O7; Steam Mill Co. v. Westervelt (1877) 67 Me. 446, 449; Stockett v.
Watkins (183o, Md.) 2 Gill & J. 326, 34, ("The law sometimes implies con-
tracts, but never where there is an express contract
') ; Walker v. Brown
(1826) 28 Ill. 378, 383 ("As in physics two solid bodies cannot occupy the same
space at the same time, so in law and common sense there cannot be an express
and an implied contract for the same thing existing at the same time") ; Young
v. Hill (1876) 67 N. Y. 162, 174 ("there being an express contract for the pay-
ment of the debt . . . the law will not imply another and a different agree-
ment for the same purpose. Expressum facit cessare taciturn").
, So the doctrine may very properly be applied where a workman sues for an
additional sum over and above that for which he expressly agreed to do the
work. Waite v. Merrill (1826) 4 Me. 3O2; Massachusetts General Hospital v.
Fairbanks (i88o) 129 Mass. 78; Phelps v. Sheldon, supra; Walker v. Brown,
supra; Cutter v. Powell (1795, K. B.) 6 T. R. 320; Ladd v. Bean (1918, Me.)
304 AtI. 8r4.
'Steam Mill Co. v. Westervelt, supra.
'Woodruff v. Moore (85o, N. Y. Sup. Ct) 8 Barb. 171; Blanchard v. Blan-
chard (1911) 2oi N. Y. 134, 94 N. E. 630.
'Richards v. Allen (384o) 17 Me. "296; Cromwell v. Norton (i9o6) 193 Mass.
291, 79 N. E. 433.
"Eastern etc. Metal Co. v. Webb (1907) I95 Mass. 356, 8r N. E. 25,; Webb
v. Fulchire (1843) 25 N. C. 485.
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the plaintiff himself.8 Therefore, the mere existence of an express
contract is not itself a sufficient reason for refusing to recognize
a non-contract debt based upon the unjust enrichment of the defendant.
Such enrichment is an additional fact to be given an operative effect
different from that of the contract itself; the words of the parties are
not the only operative facts to be considered.
Where the defendant has committed a tort, thereby enriching him-
self at the plaintiff's expense, there are numerous classes of cases
where the plaintiff is given an alternative remedy. He can recover
damages in a tort action, measured by the loss he has suffered and
without reference to the gain of the defendant; or he can sue in
indebitatus assumpsit for the amount of the defendant's wrongful
gain. If he chooses the latter remedy, he is said to "waive the tort."'
This is so well established that the citation of cases is hardly neces-
sary.10 It is not material by what particular kind of a tort the defend-
ant enriched himself; the rule is everywhere applied where the tort
consisted of fraud and deceit.1
This being the case, there should be no variation in the application
of the rule even though the deceit or fraud occurred in the formation
of a contract. In such a case the tortious acts of the defendant
should operate as follows: the plaintiff should have the legal privilege
of not performing his part, and the legal power of rescission; or he
can enforce a secondary right to damages for breach of contract in
case the defendant fails to perform as agreed; or he can maintain
suit for damages in the tort action of trespass on the case; or he can
repudiate the contract, waive the tort, and sue in indebitatus assumpsit
'Oxendale v. Wetherell (1829, K. B.) 9 B. & C. 386; Wolfe v. Howes (1859)
20 N. Y. I97.
'This is really a misdescription; for whichever remedy the plaintiff chooses,
the tort is still one of the operative facts and must be proved. In indebitatus
assumpsit, however, an additional operative fact must be proved-the quid pro
quo or enrichment of the defendant
20 See Arthur L. Corbin, Waiver of Tort and Suit in Assumpsit (igio) i9
'YA. E LAw JouRNAL, 221. The plaintiff is given a similar choice of remedies in
cases where the defendant has committed a breach of contract, enriching him-
self at the plaintiff's expense. Snow v. Prescott (1842) 12 N. H. 535; Clark
v. Manchester (1872) 51 N. H. 594. The choice is between express assumpsit
for damages suffered and debt (or indebitatus assumpsit) for value received.
"1This is universally true where the defendant obtained money from the
plaintiff by fraud. No court doubts that the plaintiff can recover this money in
indebitatus assumpsit, even though he might in the alternative have sued on the
express contract or in tort for damages. Morion v. Thompson (1874) L. R.
9 Q. B. 480; Steiner v. Clisby (1894) io3 Ala. 181, I5 So. 612; Byard v. Holmes
(I868) 33 N. J. L. ug.
Even where the defendant received value in goods or labor instead of money,
authority is ample to sustain counts for work and labor and for goods sold.
Fenemore v. U. S. (1797, U. S.) 3 Dall. 357 (stock obtained by fraud) ; Corbin,
Waiver of Tort (19io) I9 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 221, passim.
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for the value unjustly received by the defendant. Bringing suit in
this last form is not a ratification of the express contract, as some
courts have believed,' 2 because it is an action of debt based upon the
receipt of a quid pro quo and not upon mutual assent. The better
considered authorities hold that the unjust enrichment of the defendant
added to his tortious act operates to create a non-contract debt in the
plaintiff's favor.' 3
It should be observed that this is not inconsistent with the court's
statement in Prest v. Farmington that "the duty to pay damages for
a tort does not imply a promise to pay them upon which assumpsit
can be maintained." 14  No doubt this statement is strictly correct in
its exact form. Damages for a tort cannot now be recovered in
assumpsit, even though assumpsit was originally a tort action for
damages. But the receipt and the unjust retention of benefits result-
ing from the tort are separate operative facts, and these are amply
sufficient as a basis for the action of debt or its actual equivalent
indebitatus assumpsit. This is not an action for damages for a tort;
for those damages are measured by the amount subtracted from the
plaintiff's estate. Nor is it an action for damages for breach of con-
tract; for those damages would be measured by the value of the
performance promised by the defendant. Instead, it is an action of
debt based upon the receipt of a quid pro quo by the defendant, which
under the existing circumstances creates a non-contractual duty in the
defendant to pay back the value received. To enforce this duty,
indebitatus assurnpsit was the proper form of action at common law;
under the codes of procedure the duty is the same, to be enforced by
"civil action."
A. L. C.
THE COLLECTION OF ROYALTIES FROM THE SUB-ASSIGNEE OF A COPYRIGHT
In Barker v. Stickney (1918, K. B.) 1i9 L. T. 73, the plaintiff was
the owner of a copyright which he assigned to P, the latter under-
taking to pay a royalty. P became insolvent, and his receiver sold all
his assets to the defendant, who took an assignment of the copyright
and agreed to pay the royalty. The owner then sued for royalties
12 Ferguson v. Carrington, supra; Kellogg v. Turpie (1879) 93 Ill. 265.
2nRoth v. Palmer (1858, N. Y. Sup. Ct) 27 Barb. 652; Crown Cycle Co. v.
Brown (i9oi) 39 Or. 285, 64 Pac. 451; Dietz's Assignee v. Sutcliffe (883)
8o Ky. 65o; Kayser 7). Sichel (i861, N. Y. Sup. Ct) 34 Barb. 84.
"4 The court cites Cooper v. Cooper (888) 147 Mass. 370, 17 N. E. 892, a case
that has been shown most convincingly to be erroneous. See Keener, Quasi-
Contracts, 321-326. Though followed in Payne's Appeal (1895) 65 Conn. 397,
32 AtI. 948, and in Graham v. Stanton (90) 177 Mass. 321, 58 N. E. 1023,
there are several decisions contra. Fox v. Dawson (i82o, La.) 8 Mart. 94;
Higgins v. Breen (1845) 9 Mo. 497. See Woodward, Quasi-Contracts, sec. 184.
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on the contract made by the defendant with the receiver.1 The court
held that the plaintiff was a stranger to that contract and could
maintain no action upon it,2 and also that in this case the plaintiff
had'no vendor's lien upon the copyright.
It is the generally prevailing rule that when a contract is made by
two persons for the benefit of a third, the latter may enforce it
directly by action against the promisor.3 The essential justice and
practical convenience of this rule is frequently demonstrated even in
the jurisdictions where it does not prevail. Not only is it customary
in such jurisdictions to pass statutes permitting a beneficiary to sue
in certain cases,4 but new actions are continually being brought by
beneficiaries in confident reliance on the justice of their claims; and
the courts frequently manage, by maldng use of fiction and specious
distinctions, not to disappoint such suitors. The cases in which this
has been done in Massachusetts have been reviewed previously in this
JOURNAL.
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A similar tendency is observable in England. Where the suit is in
equity, the courts find the ready excuse that the relation is that of
trustee and cestui que trust,6 without looking any too closely to discover
the trust res or its amount. It is not that the promisor is held to be a
trustee and accountable to the cestui que trust, but that the promisor
owes a contractual duty, of which the promisee is a trustee for the
benefit of the third party. His right is not dependent upon a settlement
in trust; but a "trust" is conjured up in order to enforce his right.'
'Plaintiff's counsel seemed blissfully unaware that in England a third party
beneficiary has no, right. "The plaintiff in his pleading appears to place the
defendant's liabilities upon a purely contractual basis," the opinion states.
' A contrary result was reached in Massachusetts. Paper Stock D. Co. v.
Boston D. Co. (1888) 147 Mass. 318, 17 N. E. 554. The court satisfied its own
mind that it was not recognizing a right in a contract beneficiary. "By accept-
ing the assignment (the assignee) must be held to have accepted the license and
promised to pay the royalty to him" (the original licensor). This is quite
right, but the promise is made to the licensee and not to the original owner.
A labored effort to show the contrary was made in Lincoln v. Burrage (igoi)
177 Mass. 378, 381, 59 N. E. 67.
'See Arthur L. Corbin (198) 27 -YALE LAW JouluRAL, ioo8; Wald's Pollock,
Contracts (Williston's ed.) 237 et seq.
'Thus life insurance beneficiaries are everywhere permitted to sue on the
policy. Mass. St., 1894, ch. 225. Mortgagees are thus permitted to sue the
mortgagor's grantee who has assumed the debt. Mich. Comp. Laws, 1897, sec.
519; Conn. Gen. St., i9o2, sec. 587. Laborers and material men may sue on
contractors' bonds: 3o U. S. St. at L. 9o6, 33 U. S. St. at L. 8i1; Mass. St.,
1909, ch. 514, sec. 23.
5(i9i8) 27 YALE LAW JouRNAL, IO26.
'Tomlinson v. Gill (1756) Ambler, 330; Moore v. Darton (85i) 4 DeG. &
Sm. 517; Gregory v. Williams (I817) 3 Mer. 582; Page v. Cox (1851) io Hare,
163; Touche v. Metrop. Ry. Co. (1871) L. R. 6 Ch. 671, 677.
"In Lloyds v. Harper (88o, C. A.) 6 Ch. D. 29o, Fry, L. J. said, 'Where a
contract is made for the benefit and on behalf of a third person, there is an
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Again, if the promisee has the accidental forethought to say that he
is acting as the agent of the beneficiary, even though the latter knows
nothing whatever of the matter at the time, it is possible for the bene-
ficiary to ratify and enforce the contract.8  Thus do men permit their
thought processes to be directed by mere words, like "agent" or
"'trust", or by ancient and unmeaning forms.9 Even in the absence of
any expression of agency a wholly artificial privity between the bene-
ficiary and the promisor has, in some cases, been constructed by the
court.'
Another method of giving a beneficiary a remedy against the
promisor is to be found in the enforcement of an actual or construc-
tive vendor's lien. In the principal case the court held that the plain-
tiff had no vendor's lien on the copyright for the reason that there
-were no words in his original assignment to P indicating an intention
to reserve a lien.1 Had such an intention been expressed, however,
it is clear that a lien would have been recognized, with the result
that the sub-assignee would have had to pay the royalty he promised,
at least to the extent of the profits he had made.1
2
The recognition of a vendor's lien and the creation of a duty in the
sub-assignee to pay royalties direct to the vendor is merely one more
indirect method of dodging the rule (supposed to prevail in England
and Massachusetts) that a contract between two parties cannot create
rights in a third. This is true even though the sub-assignee's duty to
-equity in that third person to sue on the contract, and the person who has
entered into the contract may be treated as a trustee for the person for whose
benefit it has been entered into." Lush, L. J. said, "Where a contract is made
with A for the benefit of B, A can sue on the contract for the benefit of B,
and recover all that B could have recovered if the contract had been with B
himself." Here Lloyds sued as trustee. In Tomlinson v. Gill, supra, the bene-
ficiary sued in his own name, and the defendant had to pay the sum promised
irrespective of the value of the consideration received by him from the
promisee. The saihe was true of Gregory v. Williams, supra, and other cases.
8 This does not at all shock the logical sense of Sir Frederick Pollock, who
says (Wald's Pollock, Contracts, 229): "The consent of the principal is
Teferred back to the date of the original act by a beneficent and necessary
fiction." Such a fiction is equally available and beneficent, even though the
promisee does not describe himself as an agent of the beneficiary. But a fiction,
as such, is neither necessary nor beneficent. Instead, it darkens the mind to
the essential similarity between two classes of cases.
'It will be remembered that Maitland said "The forms of action we have
buried, but they still rule us from thdr graves."
"The Satanita, L. R. [1895] P. 248, [1897] A. C. 59; Gardner v. Denison
(1914) 217 Mass. 492, io5 N. E. 359.
uThe court feels that injustice has been done. "I must therefore hold,
though with doubt and regret, that the plaintiff in the present case has no
vendor's lien for unpaid royalties; and that the defendant has no legal duty to
account to the plaintiff.
"Werderman v. Soci~tg (881) ig Ch. D. 246; Bagot Tyre Co. v. Clipper
Tyre Co. [19o2] i Ch. 146; Paper Stock D. Co. v. Boston D. Co., supra.
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pay is limited to the extent of profits that he has made. The reserwa-
tion of a lien does not make either the original purchaser or his sub-
assignee a trustee of the copyright. No such effect is produced by a
lien on corporeal property, and the rule in case of patent and copyright
should be the same." The lien is merely a limitation upon the power
of assignment by the purchaser by means of the retention of a property
interest in the vendor. This property interest enables the vendor or
licensor to subject the res to the satisfaction of some primary claim
that arises out of the operative facts of a sale or license; and he can do
this as against a sub-assignee with notice, whether the latter has made
a promise to pay royalties or not. The mere retention of a lien does
not operate in itself to create this primary claim to royalties, as against
either the first licensee or purchaser or the sub-assignee; nor does it
create a right to profits made by user of the res. Therefore, when
the courts recognize a duty in the sub-assignee to pay royalties to the
.licensor, the fact that operates to create this duty is his promise to the
first licensee.
The duty thus created is a debt and not merely the duty of a trustee
to account; and this is true even though the court declares that the
debt is measured by and conditional upon the receipt of profits.1 4 To
the extent of the debt thus created the original licensor becomes a
creditor-beneficiary of the contract between the first purchaser and thb
sub-assignee.
The fact that the sub-assignee has property that can be applied by
the licensor or vendor (property upon which there is a "charge") is
no reason for creating a duty in the sub-assignee. Society does not
decree that A must pay B's debt to C merely because C happens to hold
A's son as a hostage or because C has a mortgage on A's land or a
vendor's lien on A's copyright. The fact that C has legal rights and
powers with respect to one bit of A's property (e. g., his privileges and
rights under the assigned copyright) is not a reason for giving C an
additional right to subject A's other property to C's uses by judgment
and execution. If C gets this additional right it is because A promised
B for a consideration to pay the debt to C.
Patents and copyrights are often spoken of as "grants" or "fran-
chises" and are also described as "property". Analysis shows that
they are merely bundles of legal relations between the holder and all
other persons; they are innumerable legal relations of right, privilege,
power, and immunity.15 For example, there is a privilege of making
So in Dansk v. Snell [19o8] 2 Ch. 127, all that the plaintiff asked was to
have the patent sold and applied to satisfy his claim against the first purchaser.
", The reasons for this limitation are not convincing.
'These legal relations are "innumerable" because each relation is a relation
with one other person. The holder of a copyright has not one right against
all other persons; instead, he has a right, a power, and a privilege with respect
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and selling, a right that another shall not make or sell, a power to assign
or to license others, and immunity from the destruction of these rela-
tions by any voluntary act of another. This bundle of relations may
properly be described as property, for they are "multital" in charac-
ter-the rights are rights in rem.' However, they do not necessarily
or usually accompany any physical res, and their assignment is not
effected, as in the case of chattels or land, by a change in physical
possession.
This last fact causes the court to have difficulty in understanding
a vendor's lien in case of a copyright.17  In thinking of a lien the
mind looks for some physical res, a sort of hostage to be held as
security. Corporeal existence and physical possession are important
facts. And yet property with respect to land or to any physical res
is like patent or copyright property in this: they both consist of rights,
powers, privileges, and immunities. On the foreclosure of a lien on
some physical res, the lienor does not necessarily get physical posses-
sion. The lien itself consists merely of rights and powers, and is of
value because it enables the lienor to cause the extinguishment of the
rights, powers, privileges, and immunities of the delinquent vendee and
the creation of similar relations in a new purchaser in return for cash.
So in the case of patent or copyright-upon non-payment of royalties
by a buyer or licensee, it is quite possible to give to the seller or licensor
the advantage of the rights, powers, privileges, and immunities of
which patent or copyright consists. They may all be given back to
him or they may be sold to some purchaser for cash. This is the chief
advantage conferred by any vendor's lien on a physical res.
The enforcement of a lien on a copyright would result in depriving
the delinquent assignee or licensee of his privileges to make and sell,
his rights that others should not make or sell, and his powers to
assign. As against the lienor, the delinquent assignee has no immunity
from their destruction. The lienor or the buyer at judicial sale gains
privileges, powers, and rights similar to those of which the assignee
to each other person. This is why Professor Hohfeld coined the word
"multital" to describe such relations. See (1917) 26 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 71,
716.
" This is why patents and copyrights are not choses in action. The rights
involved in a chose in action are rights in personam and point to some res or
chose that can be reduced to possession. Here the only rights are rights to
mere forbearance, and are in rem or "multital." For a discussion of the mean-
ing of the term "rights in ren" see article by Hohfeld, supra.
11 "I confess that this second point causes me great difficulty. I can well
understand a vendor's lien in the case of land.... In the case of a copyright
or patent it seems to me that the doctrine of a vendor's lien presents great
embarrassment in the application. But in view of the authorities, it must be
taken that such a lien may exist" Barker v. Stickney, supra, at page 76, citing
Dansk v. Snell, supra.
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has been deprived ;-that is, he may proceed to make and sell, he can
assign, and for his benefit others must forbear.
In the case under discussion, if the sub-assignee owes any duty to
the plaintiff, it is by reason of the contract of assignment between the
assignee and the sub-assignee. Of that contract the plaintiff is a
creditor-beneficiary, and if it gives him a right against the sub-assignee
to the payment of royalties, he can enforce that right by the enforce-
ment of a vendor's lien upon the copyright (in case he reserved a
lien) or he can get a judgment or decree that the sub-assignee shall
pay the royalties promised. But if it does not give him such a right
against the sub-assignee, he should be given neither a judgment for
payment nor a decree for an accounting; he. is entitled to the benefits
of his lien and nothing more. If there were a physical res the lienor
would get it or have it sold, but he would get no accounting. There
being no physical res, he must be content with the incorporeal res,
the copyright itself.
It appears therefore that a decree that the sub-assignee shall account
is the recognition of a right in a creditor-beneficiary created by a con-
tract between two other persons, a contract to which he was not a party.
Such an account had been decreed in previous English cases,'8 and
such would have been the decree in Barker v. Stickney had the court
been able to discover a lien reserved. In the one Massachusetts case
on the point it was held to be the sub-assignee's duty to the plaintiff
to pay the royalties as promised, and not merely to pay the royalties
to the extent of profits made.' 9 By such means the unjust rule deny-
ing legal rights to a contract-beneficiary can be gradually undermined
and abandoned.
A. L. C.
FULL FAITH AND CREDIT TO JUDGMENTS OF OTHER STATES
The full faith and credit clause of the federal constitution provides
that
"Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the Public
Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And
the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the manner in which such
Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect
thereof."'
'See cases cited in note 12, supra.
"Paper Stock D. Co. v. Boston D. Co., supra. See also Forbes v. Thorpe
(1911) 209 Mass. 570, 95 N. E. 955. This, is exactly paralleled by the holding
that where property is left to X by will, on condition that a payment be made
to A, the acceptance of the property by X creates a legal duty enforceable at
law by A, a duty to pay the amount specified even though it exceeds the yalue
of the property received by X. Felch v. Taylor (1832, Mass.) 13 Pick. 133;
Adams v. Adams (I867, Mass.) 14 Allen, 65; Bishop v. Howarth (i8go) 59
Conn. 455, 22 At. 432; Messenger v. Andrews (1828, Ch.) 4 Russ. 478.
'Art. 4, sec. I.
COMMENTS
The federal statute passed in pursuance thereof reads as follows:
"And the said records or judicial proceedings, so authenticated, shall
-have such faith and credit given to them in every court within the
United States as they have by law or usage in the courts of the State
from which they are taken." 2
What effect do these provisions require one state to give to judg-
ments duly rendered in other states? As is well known, great con-
fusion has existed with reference to this matter, a confusion which
has not yet been dissipated, if we may judge from the decision in the
recent case of Kenney v. Supreme Lodge, etc., Loyal Order of Moose
(i918, Ill.) 12o N. E. 631. The defendants in that case by their acts
in Alabama had caused the death in that state of the plaintiff's intes-
tate. The plaintiff sued and obtained judgment in Alabama under the
wrongful death statute of that state. The judgment not having been
paid, the plaintiff brought the present action in Illinois, basing his claim
on the Alabama judgment. An Illinois statute provided that "no
action shall be brought or prosecuted in this state to recover dam-
ages for a death occurring outside of this -state." The Supreme
Court of Illinois sustained a plea to the jurisdiction, on the ground
that the statute in question deprived the courts of Illinois of jurisdic-
tion, not only over the original cause of action but also over a suit
founded upon the judgment of another state based upon that cause
of action. In reaching its conclusion the courts argued as follows:
We have previously held that under our statute Illinois courts have no
jurisdiction to entertain suits for damages for wrongful death where
the death occurs outside the state.- The full faith and credit clause
of the federal constitution does not prevent us from going behind a
judgment of another state to examine into the nature of the original
cause of action, and "if it appears that the courts would not have had
jurisdiction of the subject matter of the original action, it will not
have jurisdicti6n of the action on the judgment."
'U. S. Rev. St. sec, 9o5; U. S. Comp. St., 1916, p. 2431. It is interesting to
note that the Australians, who considered very carefully the relevant provisions
of our constitutional law when framing the corresponding portions of the
Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act (i9oo) 63' and 64 Vict, ch. 12,
obviously were of the opinion that we had not gone far enough, for they pro-
vided as follows: "Sec. 51. The Parliament shall have power to make laws
with respect to: (xxiv.) The service and execution throughout the Common-
wealth of the civil and criminal process and the judgments of the courts of the
States; (xxv.) The recognition of the laws, the public Acts and records, and
the judicial proceedings of Cie States." "Sec. 118. Full faith and credit shall
be given, throughout the Commonwealth, to the laws, the public Acts and
records, and the judicial proceedings of every State." For a discussion of the
scope of the powers thus conferred upon the Australian Parliament see Quick
and Garran, Annotated Constitution of the Australian Commonwealth, 613-621.
8Dougherty v. American, etc. Co. (1912) 255 Ill. 369, 99 N. E. 61g; Walton v.
Pryor *(i916) 276 Ill. 563, 115 N. E. 2.
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Any such result is of course opposed to the view expressed in an
early case by Chief Justice Marshall, to the effect "that the judgment
of a state court should have the same credit, validity and effect in
every other state in the United States which it had in the state where
it was pronounced, and that whatever pleas would be good to a suit
thereon in such state, and none others, could be pleaded in any other
court of the United States."'
Although dicta in later cases threw much doubt upon the validity of
Chief Justice Marshall's statement, the Supreme Court followed it in
i9o8 in the case of Fauntleroy v. Lum,5 in which the majority of the
court, speaking through Mr. Justice Holmes, said: "We assume that
the statement of Chief Justice Marshall is correct." In the case last
cited the Mississippi Supreme Court interpreted a Mississippi statute
worded in a manner similar to that in the instant case so as to deprive
Mississippi courts of jurisdictibn both of the original cause of action
and of a suit founded upon a Missouri judgment based ipon that cause
of action. This was reversed by the Supreme Court of the United
States, four justices dissenting. The decision in the principal case
seems clearly to be in conflict with the decision in Fauntleroy v. Lum
and an attempt to revert to the dicta found in earlier cases.
Aside from the authority of Fauntleroy v. Lum, the propositions of
the Illinois court are, it is submitted, demonstrably unsound. Even
as applied to the original cause of action the interpretation of the state
statute is open to serious criticism, as the argument of Mr. Justice
Holmes in Fauntleroy v. Lum clearly shows. The statute reads that
"no action shall be brought or prosecuted," etc. Now the statute of
frauds reads: "No action shall be brought," etc., but no one imagines
that it is directed to the jurisdiction, i. e., the power, as distinguished
from the duty, of the court to act.
If the view of the court in the principal case should prevail, appar-
ently judgments of other states could be prevented from having con-
sequences of any importance in a given state by means of a very
simple device. Let the state enact, for example, a statute providing
that the state courts shall not have jurisdiction of suits based either
on any tort cause of action where the tort is committed out of the
state, or on the judgment of another state founded upon such a tort
cause of action.: if we accept the view taken in the principal case, the
full faith and credit clause is not violated, for Illinois is not bound
to confer jurisdiction on her courts. By a series of similar statutes
a state could, if it so wished, close the door to the enforcement in the
state courts of practically all judgments of other states, for, since
execution can not be issued in one state on the judgments of other
"Hampton. v. McConnell (I818, U. S.) 3 Wheat. 234. The italics in this and
following quotations are those of the present writer.
5 2to U. S. 230, 28 Sup. Ct 641.
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states, the only way to give them validity in other states is to permit
new judgments based upon them to be entered. The mere statement
of this result- ought to suffice without more to convince one of the
unsoundness of the proposition upon which it is .based.
Equally startling is the proposition of the Illinois court that "where
an action is brought upon a judgment rendered in another state, the
court may examine into the nature of the cause of action upon which
the judgment is founded, for the purpose of determining whether it
would have jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the action, and if it
appears that the court would not have had jurisdiction of the original
action it will not have jurisdiction, of the action on the judgment."
Surely this proposition cannot be supported, consistently with the full
faith and credit clause and the act of Congress passed in pursuance
thereof. It is entirely within the powers of State X to deny, if it so
pleases, jurisdiction to its courts over action for torts committed outside
the state-that' no one denies. This denial is, of course, based upon the
subject-matter of the suit-a foreign tort. But if after personal ser-
vice the injured person has obtained a judgment against the tort-feasor
in a state court which, under the law in force where the suit is brought,
has jurisdiction, and the judgment debtor has without paying the judg-
ment gone into State X, may the latter close the doors of its courts
to the judgment creditor merely by saying: "Our law gives our courts
no jurisdiction"? This cannot be the law unless the full faith and
credit clause is to be reduced to a nullity, and that will not happen so
long as the decision in Fauntleroy v. Lum stands.61 Moreover, aside
'The only authority cited is the well known case of Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins.
Co. (i888) 127 U. S. 265, 8 Sup. Ct 1370. While some of the dicta in that case
may give the Illinois court aid and comfort, the decision settled merely that the
original jurisdiction given to the United States Supreme Court by article 3,
sec. 2 of the Constitution is confined to "controversies of a civil nature," which
the judgment in question was not. The case raised absolutely no question
under the full faith and credit clause. The dicta referred to were effectually
disposed of by Holmes, J., in Fauntleroy v. Lum, cited above.
It is beyond the scope of the present Comment to discuss the validity of the
commonly recognized doctrine that a state may refuse to give effect within its
borders to the judgments of other states based upon penal laws. The leading
case in the federal Supreme Court-Huntington v. Atrill (1892) 146 U. S. 657,
13 Sup. Ct. 224-while recognizing the doctrine in the opinion, does not actually
establish it, for the decision was that the judgment in question was based upon
a law not penal in character and therefore entitled to full faith and credit.
Early American cases in the state courts gave effect to judgments based upon
penal laws. Spencer v. Brockway (1824) I Ohio, 259; Healy v. Root (1831
Mass.) Ii Pick. 389; Indiana v. Helmer (i866) 21 Ia. 370.
'& However, it must be noted that much of the reasoning, although not neces-
sarily the decision, of Mr. Justice Holmes in Anglo-American Provision Co. v.
Davis Provision Co. (1903) 191 U. S. 373, 24 Sup. Ct 92 bears out the conten-
tion of the Illinois court. In that case the learned justice wrote: "It has been
laid down ... in [previous cases] that this provision of the Constitution estab-
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from all other considerations, may it not fairly be argued that the pur-
pose of the Illinois statute-if indeed it had any definite purpose-had
been attained when the plaintiff sued and obtained judgment elsewhere
than in Illinois? So far as one can fathom the depths -of legislative
wisdom, the object of the Illinois legislature in limiting their statute
relating to death by wrongful act in the manner stated was to prevent
Illinois courts from being vexed with the determination of facts-
including foreign law-relating to death outside the state. Into none
of these does an Illinois court have to go when suit is brought there
on the judgment of another state. To permit the injured person (the
administrator of the person killed) to sue in Illinois on the judgment
of the other state would not, therefore, involve the evils-real or sup-
posed-aimed at by the statute.7  Be it noted also that the words of
the statute, literally construed, embrace only the action upon the orig-
inal cause of action-a tort action "on the case"--and not the action
on the judgment-an action of "debt on a record."18  It is only by
giving to the words of the statute an unnecessarily broad construction
that the court is able to reach its conclusion.
From whatever angle the matter is approached, therefore, whether
of reason or of authority, we must conclude that the decision in the
principal case denies to the judgment of a sister state that full faith
and credit which is demanded by the federal Constitution and the
statute of Congress passed in pursuance thereof.
W. W. C.
lishes a rule of evidence rather than of jurisdiction. The Constitution does
not require the State of New York to give jurisdiction to the Supreme Court
against its will." As applied to the case then before the court this was true,
for the plaintiff was a foreign corporation. If we accept it as generally true,
however; it is difficult to see how the decision in Fauntleroy v. Lum can
stand, for there the United States Supreme Court refused to follow the con-
struction given by the Mississippi Supreme Court to a state statute. If the
State was not bound to give any jurisdiction to its courts, on what ground
does the United States court depart from the state court's interpretation of the
state statute ?
One can not but wonder why the Illinois legislature should desire to place
any such limitation upon the bringing of actions. We constantly permit suits
in our state courts for torts committed outside the state boundaries. As the
Illinois law stands, even if full faith and credit be given to judgments of other
states, one who according to the law of the state where the act is done has
tortiously killed another may take himself and his property into Illinois and
remain free from any enforcement of the resulting liability, unless by chance
the one to whom -he is liable is a citizen of another state and can sue in the
federal courts.
'Mills v. Duryea (1813, M. S.) 7 Cranch. 481; Andrews v. Montgomery
(1821, N. Y. Sup. Ct.) ig Johns. 162.
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MOVING PICTURES AND THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY
Another State has recently been added to the lengthening list of jur-
isdictions which recognize the existence of a "right of privacy." The
circumstances which presented the question to the Supreme Court of
Kansas were both novel and interesting. The defendant, proprietor
of a store, surreptitiously took moving-picture films of a woman cus-
tomer who was making purchases in his store; these films he caused
to be enlarged and to be exhibited at a public theater to advertise his
wares. The customer, alleging that the pictures were made and used
without her knowledge or consent, brought an action for damages, and
apparently contended that the defendant's conduct wronged her in two
respects: (I) as a violation of her right of privacy, and (2) as a false
and libellous representation that she had sold to the defendant the
privilege of using her picture for advertising purposes, which brought
upon her the ridicule and contempt of people in the community. There
was no proof of special damage, and the trial court sustained a demur-
rer to the evidence. This action was reversed by the Supreme Court,
which held that the plaintiff's right of privacy had been violated and
that recovery could be had without proof of special damages. Kunz v.
Allen (I918, Kan.) 72 Pac. 532.
In recent years scarcely any subject has evoked more controversial
debate both in the courts and in legal periodical literature than has
the-so-called right of privacy.- When the question was first presented
to the New York courts, less than twenty years ago, the absence of
precedent and the general disinclination of the law to protect individ-
uals against injuries merely to their sensibilities, caused a majority'of
the court to deny the existence of such right.
2 As is well known, this
decision produced a popular clamour for legislation which resulted in
the passage by the New York legislature of a statute which forbade
the unauthorized use of a person's name or picture for purposes of
advertising or trade, and gave the injured individual a preventive
remedy by injunction, as well as a remedial action for damages
1 See (92) 12 YALE LAW JoURNAL, 35; The Law of Privacy (9,2) 12
COLUMBIA L. REv. 693; annotations in 24 L. R. A. (N. S.) 99'; 34 ibid. 1137;
L. R. A. I9i5C, 839; and Comment, An Exclusive Privilege to Photograph as
Property, (917) 26 YAIE LAW JOURNAL, 779.
'Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co. (902) 171 N. Y. 538, 64 N. E. 442.
This well-known case was a suit for an injunction to restrain the unauthorized
use of the plaintiff's picture to advertise a brand of flour. There was a strong
dissenting opinion by Gray, J.
I N. Y. Laws, 19o3, ch. 132; Consol. Laws, 19o9, ch. 34, sec. 5o-5I. The statute
was held constitutional, and was construed as creating a personal right of
privacy. Rhodes v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co. (1908) 193 N. Y. 223, 85 N. E.
1o97; affd. (Ig91) 220 U. S. 502, 31 Sup. Ct. 49o; Riddle v. McFaddon (1010
2o N. Y. 215, 94 N. E. 644.
For an interesting case holding that it was tortious under this statute to
use in a moving-picture film the name and the purported likeness of the
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Without such legislation the courts of Georgia recognized the right of
privacy,4 and other courts have followed in their train;5 although the
decisions have not been unamimous in admitting the right.8
The opinion in the Kansas case under discussion unfortunately
makes no effort to clarify the nature or to define the limits of the right
of privacy. It merely cites with approval passages from the PavesichT
case, which considers the claim to privacy as a personal right having
"its foundation in the instincts of nature," and passages from Munden
v. Harris,8 which considers it "a property right of material profit."
Between these two views, the opinion makes no choice. Indeed, it
may be thought to approve them both.
The interest which a person has in the prevention of the publication
of his picture without his consent may be of three sorts: (i) the desire
to preserve his mental peace and comfort from disturbance by dis-
tasteful publicity; (2) the possible profit he may make from his photo-
graph, if it has commercial value; and (3) the interest in his reputa-
tion, the loss of which by the false implication that he has sold the
privilege of using his picture for advertising purposes-if such
implication does in fact arise from the use of it-may cause him mental
distress or may prevent his entering into desirable social or business
relations with other persons. Should the law protect all or any of
these interests and is it necessary to recognize a right of privacy in
order to do so?"If the law aims to protect the interest first mentioned, it is necessary
to admit the existence of a right of privacy, and to recognize it as a
right of personality, and not merely as a property right. A person's
picture may be used in a way which deprives the owner of no possible
pecuniary profit but causes acute mental distress.9 Furthermore, if
plaintiff, obtained by photographing another made up to represent him, see
Binns v. Vitograph Co. (19I1) 21o N. Y. 51, i03 N. E. iio8.
4Pavesich v. New Eng. Life Ins. Co. (1904) 122 Ga. 19o, 50 S. E. 68. This
is the leading case in support of the right of privacy. It was an action for
damages for the unauthorized use, for advertising purposes, of the plaintiff's
picture and an alleged statement by him in favor of life insurance.
'Vanderbilt v. Mitchell (i907) 72 N. J. Eq. 910, 67 Atl. 97 (dictum); Edison
v. Edison Polyform & Mfg. Co. (igo7) 73 N. J. Eq. 136, 67 At. 392; Foster-
Milburn Co. v. Chinn (1909) 134 Ky. 424, 124 S. W. 364; Munden v. Harris
(I9o) 153 Mo. App. 652, 134 S. W. io76; Douglas v. Stokes (192) 149 Ky.
5o6, 149 S. W. 849 (dictum).
"Henry v. Cherry (i9o9) 3o R- 1. 13, 73 At. 97; Hillman v. Star Publishing
Co. (igrI) 64 Wash. 691, 117 Pac. 594; see also Atkinson v. Doherty & Co.
(1899) 121 Mich. 372, 8o N. W. 285.
'Supra, note 4.
"Supra, note 5.
'This was the situation in H.illman v. Star Publishing Co., supra, note 6.
The court refused to recognize the existence of a right of privacy, but felt that
an injustice was being done which called for legislation.
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the right is viewed merely as a property right which protects the
pecuniary interest of the plaintiff, it is difficult to understand the
allowance of damages for wounded feelings.10 In the aspect of a
property right, the damages should be determined by the commercial
value of the privilege of using the plaintiff's photograph. The cases,
however, make no such limitation and, as in the principal case, require
no proof of special damage. It is believed, therefore, that the right
of privacy should be frankly recognized as a personal right protecting
the plaintiff's interest in the preservation of his peace of mind from
disturbance by unjustifiable publicity."1
Laymen, it is submitted, would unhesitatingly affirm that the law
should protect such an interest. Considerations, historical and prac-
tical, which have made the courts so reluctant to give remedies for
mental distress and wounded sensibilities alonel 2 are not present to the
minds of laymen. Despite these considerations, the right of privacy
is making its way to recognition by the courts, and rightly so. New
discoveries in the art of photography and reproduction, the growth
of a journalism which considers nothing sacred or immune from public
scrutiny, and an increased importance which advancing civilization
gives to things emotional and spiritual, require that the law should
grow away from the notion that only the physical welfare of the indi-
vidual can receive legal protection.
If the interest to be protected by the law is the third one above men-
tioned, it would seem that no right of privacy need be invoked. Famil-
iar principles of libel will furnish the injured plaintiff redress, if in
fact the unauthorized publication of his picture is equivalent to a
representation that he has sold the privilege of using it, and such a
representation would bring him into ridicule or contempt.'
3 Few, if
any, of the previous cases have raised the issue squarely whether the
mere publication of a photograph for advertising purposes does by
10 It may be argued that damages for feelings may be allowed, as incidental
to the injury to a property right, as they are in seduction, for example. But
a more logical explanation seems to be found in considering the right as a
right of personality. It must be admitted, however, that to view the right solely
in this aspect causes embarrassment in the application of the remedy by injunc-
tion. But, as intimated in Vanderbilt v. Mitchell (19o7) 72 N. J. Eq. 91o, at
gig, equity should depart from the antiquated view that it can enjoin only vio-
lations of property rights.
n Space does not here permit any attempt to delimit the right of privacy so
as to avoid conflict with the principles of free speech and freedom of the
press. The subject is alluded to in several of the cases cited above.
See "Interests of Personality" (915) 28 HARv. L. REV. 343, 355-365.
'Cases such as Peck v. Chicago Tribune Co. (Igog) 214 U. S. x85, 29 Sup.
Ct 554, must be distinguished, because in them the libel consists in libellous
words which, by reason of the accompanying photograph, are understood to be
published of and concerning the plaintiff.
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implication amount to a libellous representation of this character.1 ,
The opinion in the principal case may be thought to approve, though
not as explicitly as could be wished, the contention that the defendants'
conduct was libellous.
15
MISTAKE OR FRAUD AS A GROUND FOR ANNULLING MARRIAGE
An interesting problem in the law of marriage arising out of the
present war was presented not long ago to the Tribunal Civil de la
Seine. Re Schoenberg (1918) 45 CLUNET 666. The question was
whether the fraudulent concealment on the part of the husband that
he was a subject of an enemy country was sufficient to entitle the wife
to an annulment of the marriage. The facts briefly were as follows:
A Frenchwoman married one Schoenberg in Paris on August 25, 1914.
Schoenberg had told her falsely that he was an Alsatian by birth, and
therefore a Frenchman by nationality, and the marriage certificate
recited the same facts. He was in fact a German subject and had been
born in Darmstadt. The wife petitioned for an annulment of the mar-
riage and the court granted it.' Would the same decision be reached
in this country, in England, and elsewhere? A comparative study of
the problems presented by cases or legislative provisions dealing with
the annulment of marriage may be of interest.
Art. I8o of the French Civil Code allows annulment where the con-
sent has not been freely given or there has been a mistake as to the
person.2 The article assumes that there has been a consent to marry
but that such consent is "defective." If there were no meeting of the
minds the marriage would be deemed "non-existing" that is, void,
instead of being "nul," that is, voidable. Ordinary contracts may be
annulled in France on the ground of duress, fraud or mistake. By
"4In Henry v. Cherry, supra, note 6, the count for libel, which the court held
insufficient, contained no allegation that the publication of the plaintiff's picture
constituted a false representation that he had sold the privilege of using it. In
the Pavesich case, the Chinn case, and Munden v. Harris, supra, the publication
of the picture was accompanied by a testimonial or statement falsely ascribed
to the plaintiff, and which if true would hold him up to ridicule.
" Professor Wigmore contends that the law goes beyond the principles of
libel and recognizes a person's right not to have a belief or utterance falsely
attributed to tim. This subject is closely related to the right of privacy, and
Professor Wigmore's interesting article "The Right against False Attribution
of Belief or Utterance" (1916) 4 Ky. L. J. I, should be read in this connection.
'The petition was granted on the ground of mistake, the nationality of a
person being regarded by the court as an element of his civil personality and
in time of war as an essential element of such personality.
'Art. i8o of the French Civil Code provides as follows:
"A marriage which has been contracted without the free consent of both
parties, or without the free consent of one of them, can only be avoided by the
parties themselves, or by the party whose consent was not freely given.
"When there has been a mistake as to the person the marriage can only be
avoided by the person who was led into the mistake."
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reason of the fact, however, that Art. i8o speaks of "free consent"
and "mistake" and omits all direct reference .to "fraud," the con-
clusion is drawn that a marriage cannot be attacked on the ground of
fraud as such.8 And this appears to have been the intent of the codi-
fier. Misrepresentation was such a common practice in connection
with marriage-as is shown by the French adage "en mariage trompe
qui peut"-- that it was deemed necessary in the interest of the stability
of marriage, to exclude it as a ground of annulment. In the case
under discussion it was incumbent, therefore, upon the petitioner to
prove that the fraud resulted in a mistake as to the person within the
meaning of Art. i8o.
What does the French law mean by "mistake as to the person"?
According to one view,- which accepts the view expressed by Pothier,
5
the mistake must relate to the physical identity of the person. Another,
which appears to have been the view of the French courts until 1862,
allows annulment if it concerns "essential" or "substantial" quali-
ties of the person.8 The prevailing view to-day, established by a deci-
sion of the united chambers of the court of Cassation in 1862,7 holds
that the mistake must affect the identity, physical or civil, of the person
and that mistake as to quality is not sufficient." The courts say that
the mistake in order to affect the identity of the person must relate
to the "complete civil person" and not merely to a part thereof. It
is difficult, however, to grasp what the French courts mean by this.
Impotence,9 illegitimate birth,'0 pregnancy
1 1 and conviction of crime
I Baudry-Lacantinerie & Houques Fourcade, TraWts de droit civil, Des per-
sonnes, vol. 2, nos. 1710, 1738; Dalloz, Codes annotis, Nouveau code civil, art.
i8o, n. 37; i Colin & Capitant, Cours Rlmentaire de droit civil franjais, 164.
'2 Laurent, Principes de droit civil franjais, nos. 293 et seq.
'Pothier, Mariage, nos. 312-313.
'Marriage has been annulled on the following grounds: (i) pregnancy at
the time of marriage where the husband had no improper relations with his
wife prior to the marriage. Trib. Civ. Chaumont, June 9, i858, D. 61, 5, 305;
(2) illegitimate birth. Trib. Boulogne, Aug. 26, 1853, D. 53, 3, 56; S. 54, 2,
114; (3) conviction of an infamous crime and consequent loss of civil rights.
Cass. Feb. ii, i86i, D. 6i, I, 49; (4) ignorance that the husband was a pro-
fessed monk. Colmar, Dec. 6, i811, Dalloz, Jurisprudence gintrale, Mariage,
no. 71, note.
Annulment has been denied for impotence. App. Toulouse, Mch. io, 1858,
D. 59, 2, 40.
'Cass. Apr. 24, 1862, D. 62, I, 153; S. 62, 1, 341.
" Napoleon called it a mistake as to family. 9 Fenet, Recueil complet des
travaux pr~paratoires du code civil, 46.
'Cass. Jan. 15, 1872, D. 72, 1, 52; App. Riom, June 7, and Aug. 2, 1876, D.
77, 2, 32. See also 2 Baudry-Lacantinerie & Houques Fourcade, n. 1742;
i Colin & Capitant, 166.
" App. Bordeaux, Mch. 21, 1866, D. 66, 2, 87; S. 66, 2, 209.
U2 Baudry-Lacantinerie & Houques Fourcade, no. 1743; 1 Colin & Capitant,
166.
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and loss of civil rights12 are not regarded by them as sufficient grounds
under Art. i8o for annulling a marriage. Nor is concealment by the
husband that he is a Catholic priest or a professed monk? Such
annulment will be granted, however, where a party, in order to pass
off as member of a family to which he does not belong, forges the
papers establishing his civil status.14 The question of a mistake
regarding the nationality of the husband apparently did not arise
before Re Schoenberg. Dalloz was at one time of the opinion that
if a Frenchwoman believed a foreigner to be a French citizen she
would be entitled to have the marriage annulled if the erroneous belief
was induced by fraudulent representations on his part. Later the
learned author reached the conclusion, however, that such an excep-
tion could not be justified.' 5 Other French writers"6 maintain like-
wise that a mistake regarding nationality does not affect the civil
identity of the party and hence is not a ground for annulment. The
effect of the existence of war with reference to the problem is not
considered by them.
In other countries also much difficulty has been experienced in deter-
mining the grounds upon which the annulment of a marriage should
be authorized. The only general agreement that can be found is of
a negative nature. All regard it as an unwise policy to apply the
rules governing ordinary contracts in this respect. Beyond this there
is great diversity of opinion. The most extreme position is taken by
the English courts which bind the parties "for better or for worse,"
annulment of the marriage being granted only if there is no reality
of consent. If the party was capable of consenting and has consented
the English courts do not ask how that consent was obtained.17
The provisions of the Italian Code 8 are practically identical with
those of the French Code. The courts have given to those provisions,
2 Cass. Apr. 24, 1862, D. 62, I, 153; S. 62, i, 341.
is2 Baudry-Lacantinerie & Houques Fourcade, no. i741; I Colin & Capitant,
I66; I Planiol, TraitJ JMmentaire de droit civil (6th ed.) no. 402.
"'App. Bourges, Aug. 6, 1827, D. 29, 2, 72; App. ?aris, Mch. 12, 19o3, Clunet
I903, 841.
' Dalloz, Jurisprudence Gingrale, Mariage, no. 72.
"Baudry-Lacantinerie & Houques Fourcade, no. 1739; i Colin & Capitant,
166.
. In Moss v. Moss [1897] P. 263, 269, Sir F. H. Jeune, President, said:
"I believe in every case where fraud has been held to be ground for declaring
a marriage null, it has been such fraud as has procured the form without the
substance of agreement, and in which the marriage has been annulled, not
because of the presence of fraud, but because of the absence of consent...
But when there is consent no fraud inducing that consent is material."
'Art io5, Civil Code. The draft of the civil code prepared by the govern-
ment read "essential" mistake. The senate dropped the word "essential" for
two reasons, (i) because it would renew the old controversy, raised in the
canon law, with respect to the question what. constitutes an "essential" error;
(2) because annulment should be granted only if the mistake related to the
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however, a more liberal interpretation than is done in France. They
accept in general the view followed by the French courts until 1862.
The following have been held sufficient grounds for annulment: con-
cealment by husband that he was a Catholic priest ;19 a prior religious
marriage, constituting no marriage according to the temporal law ;20
illegitimacy ;21 fraudulent concealment of his nationality by a Turk ;22
fraudulent assurance of chastity by the wife,2 but not mere conceal-
ment of unchastity.24 Art. io7 of the civil code contains the specific
provision that a marriage may be annulled on account of manifest and
incurable impotence existing at the time of the marriage.
According to Fiore 5 a mistake as to nationality is not a ground for
annulment under the Italian code. The courts have not passed upon
the precise point. The cases granting an annulment as against a
Turkish husband who had falsely represented that he was a Frenchman
involve of course a mistake as to nationality but the real ground of
those decisions was the fact that under his national law the husband
was authorized to take other wives.
The most recent codes adopt a still more liberal attitude in the annul-
ling of marriages on account of mistake or fraud. The German code
allows the marriage to be avoided if the mistake relates to such personal
identity of the person. The Commission of Coordination kept the wording of
the senate but made it clear that it did not have the meaning attributed to it
by that body. See Prudhomme, Code civil italien, 35-36 note.
The Italian jurists are- greatly divided as regards the true meaning of Art.
io5 of the code. Ricci and De Filippis hold that it refers exclusively to mis-
takes relating to the physical person. Bianchi and Lomonaco, on the other hand,
maintain that it refers to the person's civil personality and not to his physical
person. Borsari, Fiore and others agree with the majority of the French
writers that a "mistake as to the person" includes all mistakes affecting a
person's physical as well as civil identity. The identity is deemed affected if
the mistake causes a difference in the "essence" of the person. See i Ricci,
Corso di diritto" cizile (2d ed.) no. 2W; 9 De Filippis, Corso completo di diritto
civile italiano comparato, sec. 88; 5 Bianchi, F., Corso di codice civile italiano
no. 74; i Lomonaco, Istlituzioni di diritto civile (2d ed.) 351 et seq., Nozioni
di diritto civile italiano (2d ed.) 94; i Borsari, Commentario del codice civile
italiano, art. io5, sec. 283; 1 Fiore, It diritto civile italiano, no. 386.
" Naples, Nov. 23, 1874, La Legge 1874, I, 576.
'App. Catania, Dec. ig, i88i, Foro Italiano, 1882, I, 423, affirmed by Cass.
Palermo, July 4, 1883, Foro Italiano, 1883, I, 1215.
' Court of Turin, May 9, I87O, Giurisprudenza italiana, i87o, 2, 339; App.
Turin, June 5, igoo, Foro Italiano, igoo, i, io98 and note by Gabba.
' App. Brescia, Oct. io, 1883, La Legge, 1883, 2, 775; S. 86, 4, i; Cass. Turin,
July 3, 1883, Foro Italiano, 1883, 1, 937; S. 86, 4, i and note by Chavegrin.
'Rome, Dec. 6, 19o3, Monitore dei tribunali, i9o4, 95.
"Naples, July io, i9o3, Monitore dei tribunali, i9o4, 17O. Gabba would allow
annulment for want of chastity on the jart of the wife in all cases. Gabba,
L'errore sulle qualiht personali del coniuge in diritto civile Italiano, 5. Most
authors take the contrary view. Degni, L'error virginitatis. Monitore dei
tribunali, I904, I70.
i Fiore, II diritto civile italiano, no. 386.
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characteristics of the other spouse as would have deterred him from
concluding the marriage.
2 6
The precise meaning of the provisions of the German code remains
still to be settled by the courts. As regards mistake most of the Ger-
man writers2 7 are satisfied that the framers of the code meant by the
term "personal characteristics" only such qualities as lie in the person
himself and not those which connect him with a certain state, a certain
religion or a certain family. According to this view a mistake as to
nationality would not be sufficient to annul a marriage.2 8  Engel-
mann29 says that the personal qualities may be either physical, mental
or moral. Under physical qualities he includes physical capacity to
fulfil the marital obligations, contagious, loathsome or inheritable dis-
eases, pregnancy and unchastity of the woman. Under mental quali-
ties he enumerates insanity, mental weakness and gross ignorance.
Under moral qualities he mentions unkindness, drunkenness, violent
temper, idleness, inclination to cheat, and prodigality.
The Swiss code" has a provision on the subject of mistake which
6 The code provides as follows as regards mistake and fraud:
Art. 1333 "A marriage may be avoided by 'a spouse who, at the conclusion
of the marriage, was under a mistake as to the identity of the other spouse
or as to such personal characteristics of the other spouse as would have
deterred him from concluding the marriage with knowledge of the state of
affairs and with intelligent appreciation of the nature of marriage."
Art. 1334. "A marriage may be avoided by a spouse who has been induced
to conclude the marriage by fraud concerning such circumstances as would have
deterred him from concluding the marriage with knowledge of the state of
affairs and with intelligent appreciation of the nature of marriage. If the
other spouse was not guiltj of the fraud, the marriage is voidable only if the
latter knew of the fraud at the celebration of the marriage."
"A marriage may not be avoided on the ground of fraud concerning pecuniary
circumstances."
7Kipp & Wolff, Familienrecht, 76 (vol. 4 of Lehrbuch des blrgerlichen
Rechts, by Enneccerus, Kipp & Wolff (ISt & 2d ed.); 4 Planck, Biirgerliches
Gesetzbuch (3d -d.) 66; Engelmann, Familienrecht, 103 (vol. 4 of Staudinger's
Koinmentar zum biirgerlichen Gesetzbuch, 7th & 8th ed.). However, Opet &
Blume do not feel certain that the above distinction is sanctioned by the code,
and they express a doubt concerning mistakes relating to legitimate birth,
religious belief and conviction for crime. Opet & Blume, Das Familienrecht des
biirgerlichen Gesetzbuchs, 62 (vol. 4 of Kommentar by Biermann, Blume, etc.).
Endemann holds that a mistake as to "social identity" suffices. He mentions
the case of an adventurer who, having forged the requisite papers, pretends to
be a highly respected and well-to-do personage. 2 Endemann, Lehrbuch des
birgerlichen Rechts (8th & 9th ed.) 202.
'In addition to the authors cited in the preceding note see Rietschel, Die
Anfechtung der Ehe wegen Irrtums iiber pers6nliche Eigenschaften des anderen
Ehegatien, 1O4 Archiv fiir die civilistische Praxis, 339, 362; Seidlemayer, Ueber
I-ersonen- und Eigenschaftsirrtum bei der Eheschliessung nach dem brger-
lic. en Gesetzbuch, 46 Jhering's Jahrbicher, 183, 217.
Engelmann 1O2.
'The provisions concerning mistake and fraud read as follows:
See. 124. "A spouse can contest the marriage, (i) if by mistake he has
allowed himself to be betrothed, either because he did not desire the perform-
COMMENTS
is similar to the corresponding German section. It speaks, however,
of the "characteristics" of the other party instead of the "personal"
characteristics. The question has been raised by the writers whether
this omission was not intended to extend the grounds of annulment
of the German code so as to include mistakes as to qualities which do
not inhere in the person itself but which relate to nationality, reli-
gion and the like. It is generally assumed that this was the intention
of the legislators2 1 According to this view a mistake as to nationality
might be a sufficient ground for the annulment of a marriage.
Japan2 2 allows a marriage to be annulled if it was entered into as
the result of fraud or coercion. In what sense the term "fraud" is
to be understood does not appear.
According to the Brazilian Code of 1916 a marriage may be annulled
on account of an "essential" mistake as to the person
3 With a view
of avoiding the uncertainties necessarily resulting from a too general
provision, the legislation has taken the precaution to indicate what
mistakes shall be regarded as essential with respect to marriage3
4 It
enumerates the following: (i) mistake relating to the identity of the
other party, his honor, or reputation, provided the mistake is of such
a nature that married life with the other party would be intolerable;
(2) conviction of an infamous crime; (3) incurable physical defect
or a grave form of a contagious or inheritable disease endangering
the health of the other spouse or of the offspring; (4) mistake as to
virginity of the wife.
The American courts have declined to take the severe view of the
English law; they grant an annulment when the fraud goes to the
very essence of the marriage contract
5 Marriage has been annulled
in this country on the ground of pregnancy of the wife at the time of
the marriage, which she concealed from her husband who had not sus-
tained improper relations with her,
8 and on account of incurable
venereal disease2 7 Impotency also is a ground for annulment or for
ance of the betrothal itself or because he did not wish the betrothal with the
betrothed person; (2) if he was led into the marriage by a mistake as to the
characteristics of the other party to the marriage, which are of such significance
that without their existence the marital relation cannot be imputed to him.
Sec. 125. "A spouse can contest the marriage, (i) if he has been craftily
deceived as to the respectability of the other spouse, either by that party or
by a third person with that party's previous knowledge, and has been induced
thereby to marry; (2) if a disease of the other spouse which may greatly
endanger the health of the complainant or of the offspring of the marriage
has been concealed from him."
"Egger, Das Familienrecht des schweizerischen Zivilgesetzbuchs, 6i.
'Art 785, Civil Code.
'Art. 218, Civil Code.
"Art. 219, Civil Code.
'Reynolds v. Reynolds (1862, Mass.) 3 Allen 6o5 is the leading case on the
subject. See also i Bishop, Marriage & Divorce, sec. I65 et seq.
"See Ann. Cas. 1914C 1292.
" See 12 Ann. Cas. 28.
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divorce under the statutes of most states.38 On the other hand, neither
the concealment of unchastity by the wife or of her prior marriage
which has been dissolved by the death of the third party or by divorce, 9
nor the concealment of a previous condition of insanity04 or of the fact
that the party is a kleptomaniac 1 will entitle the other party to an
annulment of the marriage. It may be assumed also that the conceal-
ment by a husband of the fact that he is a subject of an enemy country
will be regarded by our courts as not going to the essence of the con-
tract.
The problem of annulment is of course one of legislative or judicial
policy. The English system has the great advantage of certainty but
it leads to intolerable conditions as between husband and wife. The
French system is very close to the English. It is interesting to note,
however, that the strictness of the code in this regard has seemed in the
eyes of the courts so unjust to the parties that they have in effect
annulled its provisions by granting a divorce whenever there has been
a fraudulent concealment of nationality, health, religion or past con-
duct.4' The German and the Swiss codes, on the other hand, err on
the side of too great liberality. Engelmann goes so far as to hold
that under the provisions of the German code a marriage may be
annulled on account of mental or moral qualities, including gross
ignorance, unkindness, violent temper, idleness and proclivity to cheat.
The sound view would appear to lie between these two extremes. In
the estimation of the writer American law represents more nearly the
correct doctrine in the matter under consideration than the law of any
of the above countries. Although our law is more liberal in the annul-
ment of marriages for mistake and fraud than the English and French
its attitude toward the subject must be characterized as conservative if
we compare it with the law of Brazil, Germany, Italy and Switzerland.
E. G. L.
"See Ann. Cas. 1913A 128.
"g See Ann. Cas. I9r4C 29.
Cummington v. Belchertown (1889) 149 Mass. 233, 21 N. E. 435.
'Lewis v. Lewis (i8go) 44 Minn. 124, 46 N. W. 323.
21 Colin & Capitant 166. Such a fraudulent concealment is regarded bs a
"grave injury" within the meaning of Art. 231 of the Civil Code.
